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Abstract. In this paper we report the experience of using AutoProof
for static verification of a small object oriented program. We identify
the problems that emerge by this activity and classify them according
to their nature. In particular, we distinguish between tool-related and
methodology-related issues, and propose necessary changes to simplify
both the tool and the method.
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1 Introduction
Formal proof of correctness of software is still not commonly accepted in practice,
even though both hardware and software technologies for verification have sig-
nificantly improved since it was first mentioned in the context of ”verifying com-
piler”1. In ideal world verifying software would need only “pushing a button”,
though this kind of provers exist, but they are limited to verification of simple
or implicit properties such as absence of invalid pointer dereference [3]. In order
to verify a software, a formal specification should be provided against which it
will be verified. Given a specification, like contracts in Design-by-Contract (DbC)
methodology, it is possible to verify specific implementations with respect to this
specification. The term Design-by-Contract was originally introduced in connec-
tion with the design of the Eiffel programming language, but is nowadays also
adopted in many other languages. For example, in C# the methodology is sup-
ported through an additional library [4]. Java has JML add-on [5], while Kotlin
has preconditions (require and requireNotNull clauses) implemented at the
language level. Contracts are fully supported in Eiffel.
Eiffel has a prover for functional correctness called AutoProof [6]. This prover
comes with a powerful methodology for framing and class invariants and it fully
supports advanced object-oriented features [7]. We here present a series of case
studies in order to test the usability of the tool and its applicability in general
practice . The tool was used for verification of three exercises of different size
and complexity: a simple class, a set of related classes and small size industrial
1 A cipher for an integrated set of tools checking correctness in a broad sense [1,2]
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project. This paper describes the results of the first exercise - verification of the
class SET, that implements classic sets from set theory: properties and classical
operations.
The challenge of this exercise is mainly related to difficulties that a new
user can encounter while using the tool for the first time. There is no explicit
documentation available: only the website and several papers from the authors
of the tool as the main source of information. However the notation has been
evolving and in some of these papers it is no longer relevant. Verification with
AutoProof often requires additional annotation that helps the tool to derive
the more complex properties from the trivial ones. However, for someone who
does not know how the tool works and what is going on under the hood, the
feedback from the tool can be useless or even confusing. Naturally, this might
be excusable if the tool is meant to be used by a limited group of scientists, but
complete documentation needs to be developed, thereby minimizing the need of
additional assertions, in order to make a verification tool applicable in industrial
practice. This is essential, because the tool still requires a knowledge of the
underlying mechanisms and a number of additional annotations.
2 Eiffel and Autoproof
Eiffel is an object oriented programming language that natively supports the
Design-by-Contract methodology [6]. All features in Eiffel should be specified
through equipping them with contracts, namely pre- and post-conditions; as
well as properties of classes through invariants. AutoProof is a static verifier for
programs written in Eiffel. It follows the auto-active paradigm[6] where verifica-
tion is done completely automated, similar to model checking [3], but where users
are expected to feed the classes providing additional information in the form of
annotations to help the proof. The tool is capable of identifying software issues
without executing the code, thereby opening a new frontier for “static debug-
ging”, software verification and reliability in addition to general improvements
to software quality.
AutoProof verifies the functional correctness of a code written in Eiffel lan-
guage equipped with contracts. The tool checks that routines satisfy pre- and
post-conditions, maintenance of class invariants, loops and recursive calls ter-
mination, integer overflow and non Void (i.e. null in many other programming
languages) references calls. For that purpose, AutoProof uses a verification lan-
guage called Boogie [8]: AutoProof translates Eiffel code into Boogie programs
as an intermediary step. The Boogie tool generates verification conditions (logic
formulas whose validity entails the correctness of the input programs) that are
then passed to an SMT solver Z3. Finally, the verification output is returned to
Eiffel.
AutoProof supports most of the Eiffel language constructs: in-lined assertions
such as check (assert in many other programming languages), types, multi-
inheritance, polymorphism. By default AutoProof only verifies user-written classes
when a program is verified, while referenced libraries should be verified sepa-
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rately or should be based on pre-verified libraries, e.g. EiffelBase2 [9]. This
pre-verified library offers many different data structures with all features fully
verified.
3 Case study experience
The first stage in series of case studies was verification of simple example –
the implementation of an ordinary class for a generic implementation of sets,
MY SET, using lists ( V LINKED LIST from the EiffelBase2 library) and equip-
ping it with contracts. Corresponding annotations were added to help AutoProof
to prove the class.
Set properties were expressed as invariants, namely:
– No duplicate elements
– Order of elements in the set is not important
– Cardinality is always greater or equal to 0
The class implements some basic set operations:
– is empty - a query that states whether the set contain no elements
– cardinality - number of elements in the set
– has - a query that states whether the set contains a given element
– is strict subset, is subset - queries that states whether the set is a subset (or
a strict subset) of a given set
– union, intersection, difference - functions returning new set with the union,
intersection of difference with a given set, respectively
During the verification process, it turned out, that working with V classes
was too complicated for non-expert users. Therefore the decision was done to
simplify the example replacing V LINKED LIST with SIMPLE LIST.
4 Problems taxonomy
Despite the simplicity of the class, various problems arose due to lack of user
experience with the AutoProof tool, ranging from issues with the tool installation
all the way to issues with checking the verified class with tests. In our analysis,
these problems have been divided into two main categories: problems with the
tool and problems with the approaches or methodologies used in the tool.
1. Problems with the tool
(a) Lack of documentation
(b) Poor tool feedback
(c) Redundancy in notations
(d) Misleading notations
(e) Order of assertions
(f) Limitations of the tool
(g) User Interface (UI) bug
(h) Difficulties with installa-
tion/compilation from the
sources
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2. Problems with methodologies
(a) Semantic collaboration (b) Framing
The first category includes rather minor problems and bugs, mostly related to the
particular implementation in the tool and means that those require local fixes.
However, the second category require improving the methodology or replacing
them with the alternative ones.
4.1 Problems with the tool
The challenge of this exercise was mainly related to the fact that it had to be
done by a person who has no previous experience with AutoProof, nor any other
similar tools. The difficulty is not in some sophisticated user interface (UI), quite
the opposite, it is rather simple (see figure 1) - a “Verify” button and a table,
where the results are being displayed. The main obstacle is in the fact that, the
tool expects an input in terms of assertions, and it is not always clear what the
real effect of each input is.
Fig. 1. UI of AutoProof
Lack of documentation As we previously described, the tool requires addi-
tional annotations that assist the verification and help to derive one property
from another. Although AutoProof exploits the syntax of the Eiffel language,
additional annotations have been introduced by the developers of the tool. Most
of them are briefly described in the online manual, which is available on the EVE
website2. In addition, there is an online tutorial which is useful for quick acquain-
tance with the tool. However, this is clearly an insufficient reference material for
working with the tool.
Overall, there is not much of documentation available online: the website, and
several papers from the authors of the AutoProof tool.Moreover, the notation has
been evolving and in some of these papers it is no longer relevant.Naturally, this
2 EVE (Eiffel Verification Environment). EVE is a development environment integrat-
ing formal verification with the standard tools
Initial steps towards assessing the usability of a verification tool 5
might be excusable if the tool is meant to be used by a limited group of scientists.
On the other hand, if the idea is to apply verification in industrial practices, then
documentation is essential. The tool still requires documentation that explains
the annotations needed and the knowledge of the different mechanisms.
Poor tool feedback The process verification (or static debugging) starts with
pushing a “Verify” button. The tool then returns some feedback in the form of
success, error and failure messages. A failure message is a message that shows
the property that cannot be proved. An error message consists of information on
some issue with the input. In both case, whether it is error or failure messages,
users need to fix them by adding missing assertions. This process repeats until
the class is fully verified. AutoProof implements a collection of heuristics known
as “two-step verification” that helps discern between failed verification due to
real errors and failures due to insufficiently detailed annotations [6]. These failure
messages are usually informative: they describe the property and sometimes the
reason of the failure. On the other hand, error messages usually do not tell more
than that the tool cannot proceed with the input it has received.
If there is an error during the translation to Boogie the verification process
stops and AutoProof returns an error message about “internal failure” in some
cases with no additional information. Usually, this errors are caused by newly
entered assertions, which makes the process of correcting them easier. However,
if this is not the case, then it is difficult to understand what exactly causes the
error. This may become an issue when verifying the whole class, with all its im-
plemented features and stated contracts, because it is not possible to determine
the source of the error. The solution might be to comment out the features and
iteratively verify them one by one by decommenting them.
Redundancy in annotations AutoProof supports most of the Eiffel language
as used in practice [6]. It also introduces some new notations that support the
methodologies used for verification. These notations are useful for manipulat-
ing the defaults of semantic collaboration in features and classes (this will be
discussed in 4.2).
However, some of these additional notations introduce redundancy. For ex-
ample all creation procedures in Eiffel must be listed under the key word create.
Autoproof does not make use of this and instead expects the user to explicitly
declare the creation procedure as depicted in Figure 2. Even though the proce-
dure make is defined as a creation procedure in Eiffel, the verifier expects an
additional note clause with status: creator in order to treat it as creation
procedure.
Another example is the possible inconsistencies on the given annotations.
In Autoproof, one can declare a procedure as pure, specifying that it will not
change the state of the object, or impure specifying that the procedure might
change the state. This can also be achieved by listing the locations that the
procedure might change. This is done by using the annotation modify. If the
clause is empty it means that the function is pure, impure otherwise. For
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create make
feature
make
note
status: creator
do . . . end
Fig. 2. Accepted creation procedure by Autoproof.
Autoproof to be able to prove the procedure union in Figure 4, it has to be
defined with the impure annotation. This means that it does modify the state
of the object. The empty clause modify then needs to specify that the function
is pure. This is done in order to be able to use wrap and unwrap in the function
(as explained later on).
Misleading notations AutoProof support inline assertions and assumptions,
which can be expressed using the check clause supported by Eiffel. Checks are
intermediate assertions that are used during the debugging process in order to
check whether the user has the same understanding of the state at a program
point as the verifier [10]. However, removing an intermediate check clause from
successfully verified feature might make the verification process fail. This, more
than being there for the user, is due to check assertions and guides the verifier
towards a successful verification. Probably this is a design solution: not to in-
troduce another clause but to use an existing one from the language. However,
this might confuse users.
Order of assertions A check clause is useful because the verifier does not just
check the property enclosed, but also uses it for further derivations in case the
property was proved correct. The same applies to class invariants, and that makes
the order of properties substantial for the tool. This means that properties are
joint not by the and operator, but by and then, which may lead to verification
failures even if all needed properties are stated (although in improper order).
For example, there are two assertions depicted in figure 3: the first for setting
up the relation between elements (the model) and data (the implementation);
the second, for defining owned object by Current3. However, in this order the
verification will fail, while it will succeed if owns def is stated first.
Limitations of the tool Null pointer dereferencing is a well-known issue in
object-oriented programming. In Eiffel, this can be avoided by letting the com-
piler check for call consistency [11]: the object source making the call cannot
be a Void object. Currently, Autoproof does not make use of this property of
3 denoting the current object in Eiffel
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invariant
model def : elements = data.sequence.range
owns def : owns = [data]
. . .
Fig. 3. The order of invariant assertions.
Eiffel. For instance the verified library EiffelBase2 can only be used when the
void-safety property of Eiffel is disabled. There is a coming version of the tool
to support these two Eiffel environments, but the version is not available yet.
User Interface (UI) bug The tool lacks support which can be observed in
some rare bugs. For example, it can skip some of the features of the class or
verify only one of the features instead of the whole class. Even though, the tool
never returned improper successful verification results, these kinds of bugs might
be disrupting to the user.
Difficulties with installation/compilation from sources There are two
ways to get the tool working on a local computer: by installing the build (avail-
able online) or compiling the tool from the source code. For the latter option,
the repository requires a clean-up for compiling. Therefore, is better to use the
former method.
In addition, there are several manipulation has to be done while creating a
new project in AutoProof, such as disabling some options and reopening the
project in order to clean it.
4.2 Problems with methodology: Semantic collaboration and
Framing
AutoProof supports advanced object-oriented features through a powerful method-
ology to specify and reason about class invariants of sequential programs [7]. But
this power comes at the price of simplicity - the tool requires users to under-
stand all the underlying methodologies. This limits the tool to expert users by
exceedingly complicating the verification of even such simple classes.
Semantic collaboration AutoProof supports semantic collaboration, i.e. the
full-fledged framing methodology that was designed to reason about class invari-
ants of structures made of collaborating objects [7]. This methodology introduces
its own annotations which do not exist in the Eiffel language. Annotations are
used to equip features and entire classes with additional information which are
used by the verifier. These include ghost attributes – class members used only
in specifications – which are useful when maintenance of global consistency is
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required as in subject/observer or iterator pattern examples [7]. These ghost
attributes and default assertions that are added into pre- and post-conditions
often result in over-complicating the verification process of rather simple classes.
During initial steps of the verification process of the case study presented
in this paper, time was spent on trying to understand the failure message:
“default is closed may be violated on calling some feature” for some private
attribute. Basically, the tool was expecting owns = [data] in the invariants of the
class which is not obvious without understanding the methodology. Moreover,
for this specific example the property could have been derived from exportation
status of the attribute. Eiffel language supports the notion of “selective export”,
which exports the features that follow to the specific classes and their descen-
dants [12]. The verifier ignores this useful information and requires the properties
to be stated explicitly. Considering selective export might decrease the need for
using semantic collaboration [13].
Framing The framing model is used in AutoProof in order to help reason about
objects that are allowed/not allowed to be updated. There are different ways to
specify this, for instance by adding modifies clauses in pre-conditions. One can
specify one or more model fields, attributes of the class or list of objects which
may be updated. This is rather intuitive and straightforward, though it seems to
be more relevant to post-condition clauses. Another alternative is to make use of
default clauses included into each routine, so the framing model should be used
only if the behavior of the routines is different than from default. For example,
in MY SET class, all routines are pure (no side effects), hence all routines were
equipped with an empty modify clause. Even in a function that is defined as pure
using the modify clause, that function needs to be specified as impure in order
to use is wrapped clause, even though it does not modify the state of any object
(see figure 4). This might confuse the user.
5 Related Work
Formal notations to specify and verify software systems have existed for a long
time, in particular in some specific domain such as process modeling [14]. A
survey of the major approaches can be found in [15], while [16] discusses the
most common methodological issues of such approaches. Another approach, as
in [17,18], is to use the formal notation of a modeling language to specify and
verify software systems to then translate it to a programming language.
In [19] the authors present an extensive survey of algorithms for automatic
static analysis of software. The discussed techniques (static analysis with ab-
stract domains, model checking, and bounded model checking) are different, but
complementary, to the one discussed in this paper, and they are also able to
detect programming errors or prove their absence.
The importance of focusing on usability requirements for verification tools
has been identified in [20]. The authors have classified usability properties into
three main categories: Interface, Utility and Resources management. Since the
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feature −− Queries
union(other : like Current) : like Current
−− New set of values contained in ‘Current’ or ‘other’
note status : impure
require
modify nothing : modify([ ])
. . .
end
Fig. 4. Pure function (empty modify clause) specified as impure (note clause status:
impure)
interface of AutoProof tool consists of a button and a table, the interface cat-
egory was omitted. Only utility (in term of clearness of error/failure messages)
and Resources management (in term of properties such as installation, docu-
mentation) were considered.
The results of testing the usability of AutoProof, in particular, by non-expert
users has been studied in [21], where programmers with little formal methods
experience were exposed to the tool.
6 Conclusion
AutoProof is not trivial in its usage and needs detailed knowledge of what is
going on behind the scenes. The tool requires a number of additional assertions
in pre- and post-conditions, as well as in invariants for successful verification,
while ignoring some information that has been already provided. To be used in
practice the usability of the tools needs to be be significantly improved to the
level where verification is simple enough to be used by ordinary programmers.
By simple we mean, that it should:
– require less additional annotations by automatically deriving properties from
information which is currently being neglected and by removing redundant
clauses and reworking some of ghost class members;
– provide clearer feedback in case some property can not be satisfied, offering
hints and possible solutions;
In addition, it is important to:
– develop a documentation describing all used methodologies, including de-
tailed information about notations with examples
– clean up and rebuild the tool from latest sourced that are available in the
EVE repository and fix all the bugs that we identified;
As a further work, AutoProof will be tested through verification of a set of
related classes and a small size industrial project, the Tokeneer project4.
4 http://www.adacore.com/sparkpro/tokeneer/download
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